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I. INTRODUCTION
The computer software and firmware industries spend an enor-
mous sum of money each year' on the development of new programs.2
Developing, marketing and maintaining an individual program may
involve a substantial investment. A potential for profit obviously exists
if a successful program can be copied, thereby saving development and
other related expenses,3 or if a computer user can run a program with-
out paying the usual fees to its owner. It is hardly surprising that con-
siderable attention is now being focused on the means by which owners
may secure legal protection against the copying or unauthorized use of
their programs.
In the United Kingdom, a computer program may not be pat-
Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law. A preliminary draft of this article was
written for, and with the use of the resources of, the Chicago Office of Baker & McKenzie.
I An estimated £7500 million was spent worldwide in 1974 on software development and
maintenance. WHITFORD COmmn=mE, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE TO CONSIDER THE LAW ON
COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS, CMD. No. 6732 (1977). Software development accounts for more than
half of the cost of creating the average computer system. THE ECONoMIsT, Dec. 18, 1982, at 92.
2 The term "program" is used throughout this Article to describe any software or firmware
process for giving commands to a computer. It does not imply the use of any particular program
medium. Hence, it would include a written program, punched cards, a magnetized tape, or a
stream of electronic impulses sent directly to a client's computer. It would also include a firmware
program, stored in a chip or memory circuit. This article does not discuss hardwired programs
because they form part of the computer itself.
3 An example of a saving in marketing costs appears in Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University
Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Defendant produced programs with formats
for data input that were compatible with those marketed as part of a computer package by the
plaintiff. Plaintiff's program price included an element for plaintiffs expenditure on training cus-
tomers in the use of its input format. Thus, by selling to plaintiffs already trained customers, the
defendant was able to undercut plaintiffs prices.
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ented.4 Other forms of legal protection are, however, available. First,
although the courts have not been called on as yet to decide whether
programs are protected by copyright, good arguments support the view
that the current copyright statute is drafted broadly enough to include
most types of software and firmware.5 Second, in certain circum-
stances, a program owner may protect his software from unauthorized
disclosure by an action in equity for an injunction to prevent a breach
of confidence, or may sue for damages after the breach has occurred.
Finally, a program owner who can point to a contractual term impos-
ing an obligation of confidence on the defendant, or who can persuade
the court that such a term should be implied in the parties' contract,
may bring an action in contract to prevent wrongful disclosure or to
obtain damages for a breach. The law governing the protection of intel-
lectual property in equity and by contract generally is referred to as the
law of trade secrets.
The purpose of this Article is to explore the availability of legal
protection for a published program. Part I outlines the United King-
dom law concerning the availability of copyright and trade secret pro-
tection for computer programs. Part II details those situations in which
it may be possible to protect a program both in copyright and as a trade
secret. This level of protection is ideal for the program owner, but
achieving it depends on avoiding the problems that arise as a result of
the opposed underpinnings of the two classes of legal protection: for
while copyright law is informed by the doctrine of publicity, the antith-
esis of that doctrine informs the law of trade secrets. Part III explores
the availability of remedies for breach of confidence in cases where the
plaintiff publishes the program prior to judgment and in such a way as
to end its confidentiality.
II. OUTLINE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM LAW
A. Copyright
Copyright law in the United Kingdom is governed by the Copy-
4 Patents Act, 1977, ch. 37, § 1(2)(c). On the possibility that patent protection is available in
some cases even after the 1977 Act, see B. NIBLETT, LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PRO-
GRAMS 30-33 (1980).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 8-11. See WHITFORD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1,
492; E. SKONE JAMES, J. MUMMERY & J. RAYNER JAMES, COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON
COPYRIGHT 154 (12th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES]; H. LADDIE,
P. P ESCOTr & M. VITORIA, THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT 92-97 (1980); C. TAPPER, COM-
PUTER LAW 18-20 (2nd ed. 1982); Wilson, The Protection of Computer Programs under Common
Law, in THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTwARE 75, 79-83 (H. Brett & L. Perry eds.
1981).
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right Act, 1956.6 While the Act makes no specific provision for copy-
right in computer programs,7 it seems likely that programs will enjoy
protection under the Act as "literary works." A "literary work" is de-
fined as including any written table or compilation;S and "writing" is
defined in section 48(1) as any form of notation by hand, printing, type-
writing or by some similar process. The similarity between these
processes is that they produce a visible notation. Most computer pro-
grams consist of notations that are not directly visible to the eye. They
generally are recorded on magnetic discs or tapes or on the surface of
microcircuit chips. Thus, it is unlikely that a court would hold a non-
eye-readable program to be "written" within the meaning of the Act.
Such programs may, nevertheless, qualify for copyright protection be-
cause the Act defines literary works non-exhaustively, as including
written works, and thus leaves open the argument that programs are
protected even though not in written form. Support for the view that
the Act contemplates protection for non-written works may be found in
section 49(4), which provides that literary works are "made" at the time
when they are first reduced "to writing or some other materialform."9
Even a program consisting of a pattern of electrical charges on a chip
would seem to exist in material form. I Alternatively, it might be ar-
gued that a program exists in material form whenever it is fixed in a
form from which it could be reproduced. I Either analysis would result
in programs being eligible for copyright protection.
The 1956 Act provides protection for both published and unpub-
lished works. No registration is required. Copyright inheres automati-
6 Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74.
7 Proposals "to make explicit in new legislation that computer programs attract protection
under the same conditions as literary works" are outlined for comment in a recent government
Green Paper (consultative document). REFORM OF THE LAW RELATING TO COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS
AND PERFORMERS' PROTECTION, CMD. No. 8302, ch. 8, 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Green
Paper].
8 Copyright Act, 1956, supra note 6, § 48(1). Thus, a railway timetable has been held to be
a literary work. H. Blacklock & Co. v. Pearson, Ltd., [1915] 2 Ch. 376.
9 Copyright Act, 1956, supra note 6, § 49(4) (emphasis added).
10 The concern in section 49(4) of the Copyright Act is that there should be some record of the
information claimed to be copyrighted such that the court may inspect it. The record sets the
bounds of protection. Information that exists only in the mind of the person claiming copyright
lacks the concreteness necessary before the court can step in and say "this information is copy-
righted." The requirement of a record in material form is a practical one, and the record of a
program on a silicon chip performs the same concretizing function as writing.
11 The government takes the view that any reproducible program should be protected. Green
Paper, supra note 7, ch. 8, 3. The government also proposed that it should be made clear by
statute that the act of loading a program into a computer constitutes a reproduction of the pro-
gram. Id
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cally in every unpublished literary work it the time it is made.' 2 It
inheres in published works at the moment of first publication.13 Al-
though protection is nominally limited to works authored by statutorily
defined "qualified persons,"' 4 and to works by other persons that were
first published in the United Kingdom, the scope of the Act is extended
by international treaties.' 5 The Berne Copyright Convention (Paris
Revision 1971)16 provides protection for "literary and artistic works,"
defined to "include every production in the literary, scientific and artis-
tic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression."' 7
This language seems fit to cover computer programs in any form.
Under the Berne Convention, protection is afforded unpublished pro-
grams authored by habitual residents of the country in which copyright
is sought or by nationals of any member country of the Berne Union.'8
Also protected are programs first published in a member country or
published in a member country within thirty days of first publication
elsewhere.' 9 Publication may be by copies, however manufactured,
"provided that the availability of such copies has been such as to satisfy
the reasonable requirements of the public, having regard to the nature
of the work."20 Given the restricted class of persons interested in com-
puter programs, the offer of copies for sale or lease to computer users
should amount to publication of a program for the purposes of the
Convention.2'
Protection in member countries of works covered by the Berne
12 Copyright Act, 1956, supra note 6, § 2(1).
13 Id § 2(2).
14 Id § 1(5). A qualified person is a British subject, or any person domiciled or resident in the
United Kingdom, or a corporation incorporated under United Kingdom laws.
15 These treaties are cited infra in notes 16, 24. The treaties were made applicable in the
United Kingdom by Order in Council by the Copyright (International Conventions) Order, STAT.
INST. 1979, No. 1715. For a discussion of the treaties, see generally COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES,
supra note 5, ch. 28; Kinderman, Computer Software and Copyright Conventions, 3 EUR. INTELL.
PRoP. REv. 6 (1981).
16 International Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, done at Berne
in 1886, revised at Stockholm in 1967, art. 2(1) 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 53 (CMD. 4412) [hereinafter
cited as Berne Copyright Convention].
17 Following the recommendation in the WHITFORD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, 11 50-
60, 85, the United Kingdom is expected to ratify the Paris Revision in the near future. Recently, it
ratified the Brussels Revision of 1948, and articles 22-38 of the Stockholm Revision of 1967. Id
18 On authorship of computer programs, see H. LADDIE, P. PREscoTr & M. VITORIA, supra
note 5, 11 2.139-.140.
19 Berne Copyright Convention, arts. 3(l)(6), 3(4), supra note 16.
20 Id art. 3(3).
21 The meaning of the requirement that publication satisfy the reasonable requirements of the
public is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 86-92.
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Convention is governed by the respective laws of those countries, sub-
ject to various minimum protection provisions set otat in the Conven-
tion.22 Outside the country of origin of the work,23 protection may not
be made subject to any formality.
A number of countries, including the United States and the Soviet
Union, are not parties to the Berne Convention, but are signatories of
the Universal Copyright Convention (Paris Revision 1971).24 The
United Kingdom is a signatory of both conventions. Under the Uni-
versal Copyright Convention, each contracting state agrees to give
works by nationals of other contracting states that are first published
within any contracting state the same protection given to works first
published within its own borders; and to give the unpublished works of
nationals of other contracting states the same protection as it affords
unpublished works by its own nationals.2 5 Contracting states must,
however, provide a certain minimum level of protection for works
originating outside their own jurisdiction, as set out in the
Convention.26
Eye-readable programs authored by nationals of contracting states
and first published outside the United Kingdom have copyright protec-
tion in the United Kingdom under the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion. Protection is provided only if all copies published bear the
symbol "," accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor and
the year of first publication placed in such a manner and location as to
give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright.2 7 Meeting the notice
requirement may demand some ingenuity from software producers re-
lying on the Convention for United Kingdom protection. A more seri-
ous problem, however, is that a non-eye-readable program may not be
protectable as a published work under the Convention at all, because
publication is defined in Article VI as "the reproduction in tangible
form and the general distribution to the public of copies of a work from
which it can be read or otherwise visually perceived."28 Even though
the distribution requirement probably is met whenever programs are
offered for sale or lease to the computer-using sector of the public, Arti-
cle VI seems to envisage protection only for directly readable pro-
22 Berne Copyright Convention, arts. 6br-15, supra note 16.
23 See id art. 5(4) for a definition of the "country of origin."
24 Universal Copyright Convention, done at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No.
7868 (1975 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 9, CmD. No. 5844).
25 Id art. II.
26 ld arts. V, bf
, 
V.
27 Id art. IH(1).
28 1d art. VI.
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grams.2 9 Therefore, it would be advisable for any United States
proprietor of a non-eye-readable program who forsees the need for
United Kingdom copyright protection to secure protection under sec-
tion 2(2) by publishing the program first in the United Kingdom.3 °
B. Trade Secrets: The Obligation of Confidence
Most contracts for the licensing, lease or sale of programs include
an express term providing for confidentiality. A simple term might
merely require that the licensee, lessee, or purchaser maintain the con-
fidential nature of the program and related materials provided for its
own internal use under the contract. A more imposing clause, calcu-
lated as much to impress the customer with the need for secrecy as to
provide a firm basis for any claim to legal protection, however, would
be more usual. A typical clause might read:
Licensee recognizes that the software furnished under this license agree-
ment and all information furnished with respect thereto are confidential
information and trade secrets, disclosed to licensee on a confidential basis
and to be used only as expressly permitted by the terms of this license
agreement. Licensee, its officers, directors, employees and agents agree to
protect the licensed software and all information with respect thereto as
the confidential information and trade secret property of licensor and
shall not disclose to any person, company, or firm, other than licensor,
any information concerning the licensed software: provided that disclo-
sures may be made to licensee's employees when reasonably required for
normal use of the licensed software in accordance with the terms of this
agreement.
Similarly, a software company's contracts with its employees and in-
dependent consultants usually includes express terms imposing obliga-
tions of confidence on the employee or consultant in relation to the
company's trade secrets disclosed to him in the course of his
employment.
Even where no express contractual term as to confidentiality is
included,
If two parties make a contract, under which one of them obtains for the
purposes of the contract or in connection with it some confidential matter,
even though the contract is silent on the matter of confidence, the law will
imply an obligation to treat that confidential matter in a confidential way,
as one of the implied terms of the contract.... .
29 For an argument to the contrary, see Kinderman, supra note 15, at 10-1I.
30 "[A] publication in the United Kingdom... shall not be treated as being other than the
first publication by reason only of an earlier publication elsewhere, if the two publications took
place within a period of not more than thirty days." Copyright Act, 1956, supra note 6, § 49(2)(d).
31 Saltman Eng'g Co. v. Campbell Eng'g Co., 65 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 203, 211 (C.A. 1948)
(Lord Greene, M.R.). See also Ackroyds (London) Ltd. v. Islington Plastics Ltd., [1962] R.P.D. &
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The courts are unlikely to imply such a term where publication of the
program for which protection is being claimed preceded the alleged
breach and rendered the software non-confidential. Nonetheless, the
courts would not have the same reluctance to imply a term where the
defendant published the program himself, or where the publications
did not end the confidentiality of the program.
An action on an express or implied contract term providing for
confidentiality is governed by the ordinary rules of contract and by the
rules governing the availability of remedies for breach of contract.3 2 In
an action for breach of an express confidentiality term, whether the
program was in fact confidential at the time of the alleged breach is not
a relevant factor to be considered on the issue of liability.33 But, it is a
very important factor when fixing the measure of damages for past
breaches and when deciding whether to issue an injunction to prevent
future breaches. The availability of damages and an injunction will
depend on whether the program's confidentiality was lost prior to the
breach as a result of plaintiffs publication. 4
The imposition of a duty of confidence does not depend on the
existence of any express or implied contract term as to confidentiality.
An action in equity for breach of confidence has existed since at least
the two early cases of Prince Albert v. Strange35 and Morison v. Moat.36
This action survives by virtue of section 46(4) of the Copyright Act,
1956, by which "nothing in [the] Act shall affect the operation of any
rule of equity relating to breaches of trust or confidence." 37 Broadly
stated, the rule is that "[i]f a defendant is proved to have used confiden-
tial information, directly or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff, without
the consent, express or implied, of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an
T.M. Cas. 97 (Ch.) (confidentiality term implied as necessary to give business efficacy to the
contract).
32 See generally H. McGREoR, McGREGOR ON DAMAGES (14th ed. 1980); CHITrY ON CON-
TRACTS pt. 7 (24th ed. 1977).
33 A confidentiality term might, however, be unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint of
trade, or as contrary to article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, entered inforce Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, insofar as it purports to protect
information already in the public domain.
34 For a detailed discussion of remedies for breach of confidence, see infra notes 93-128 and
accompanying text.
35 18 L.J. Ch. 120 (1849).
36 20 L.J. Ch. 513 (1851). For a history of the action, see LAW COMMISSION REPORT No. 110,
BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, CmD. No. 8388, pt. III (1981) [hereinafter cited as LAW COMMISSION
No. 110].
37 Copyright Act, 1956, supra note 6, § 46(4).
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infringement of the plaintiffs rights. 3 s
The equitable obligation of confidence may be implied from the
circumstances of the case. Despite the lack of a generally accepted test
to determine if particular circumstances import an obligation of confi-
dence,39 Mr. Justice Megarry has suggested that:
It may be that that hard-worked creature, the reasonable man, may be
pressed into service once more. . . . [I]f the circumstances are such that
any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the informa-
tion would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information
was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose
upon him the equitable obligation of confidence.40
In practice, such a test would give results very similar to those that
might be expected under the test proposed by the Law Commission in
its report on breach of confidence:4 1 that the obligation of confidence
be inferred from the nature of any relationship between the parties or
from the recipient's conduct in relation to the person who gave him the
information.42
Where there is no contract and an action is brought in equity for
breach of confidence, the essential question is whether the information
was published prior to the alleged breach because "the information to
be confidential, must, . . .apart from contract, have the necessary
quality of confidence about it, namely, it must not be something which
is public property and public knowledge. ' 43 The usual formulation of
this requirement is that at the time of the alleged breach the informa-
tion must not have been in the "public domain."
Even though most software lease, license or sale contracts do in-
clude express confidentiality terms, the possibility of an equitable ac-
tion for breach of confidence remains important in situations involving
software because the action may be available against persons with
whom the plaintiff has never had any contractual relationship. This
may occur where confidential information is disclosed during negotia-
tions that break down before any contract is made, 4 or where parties
38 Saltman Eng'g Co. v. Campbell Eng'g Co., 65 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 203, 213 (C.A. 1948)
(Lord Greene, M.R.).
39 See Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1967] Ch. 302, 330 (Ch.).
40 Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng'rs) Ltd., [1969] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 48 (Ch.) (dictum).
41 LAW COMMISSION No. 110, supra note 36.
42 Draft Bill, § 3(l)(b), reprinted in LAW COMMISSION No. 110, supra note 36.
43 Saltman Eng'g Co. v. Campbell Eng'g Co., 65 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 203, 215 (C.A. 1948)
(Lord Greene, M.R.). This requirement can be traced back to James v. James, 41 L.J. Ch. 353
(1872), and Reuters Telegram Co. v. Byron, 43 L.J. Ch. 661 (1874). The definition of "public
domain" is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 57-84.
44 E.g., Seager v. Copydex Ltd., [1967] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 349 (C.A.). In this case, plaintiff
inventor revealed a new idea for a stair carpet fixing device during negotiations with defendant
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continue to use confidential information even after their licenses are
terminated.4
III. THE INTERACTION OF TRADE SECRET AND COPYRIGHT LAWS
In many circumstances it is desirable for a program producer to be
able to claim both copyright and trade secret protection for its pro-
grams. The copyright laws provide redress against the "copying" of a
program, that is, against its reproduction in any material form , 46 its
publication47 or its adaption48 (including adaption by translation,49
which would probably include translation of a program from source
code to machine or object code). There is no copyright, however, in
ideas or in information-only in a particular form of their expression.
Thus, the copyright laws do not prevent a competitor's use of an idea
from a program. The "idea" versus "expression" distinction is illus-
trated in a hypothetical situation developed by the United States Dis-
trict Court of Texas in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University
Computing Co.:
The familiar "figure-H" pattern of an automobile stick is chosen arbitrar-
ily by an auto manufacturer. Several different patterns may be imagined,
some more convenient for the driver or easier to manufacture than others,
but all representing possible configurations .... The pattern ... may
be expressed in several different ways: by a prose description in a driver's
manual, through a diagram, photograph, or driver training film, or other-
wise. Each of these expressions may presumably be protected through
copyright. But the copyright protects copying of the particular expres-
sions of the pattern, and does not prohibit another manufacturer from
marketing a car using the same pattern.
50
The intricacies of the law in the area of copyright infringement will not
be discussed here:5' it is enough for our present purposes that it be
realized that copyright provides no protection for ideas, as such, and
concerning its proposed manufacture of the device. After the negotiations failed, the defendant
manufactured a clip very similar to the device described by the plaintiff, who was awarded dam-
ages for breach of confidence.
45 E.g., National Broach & Mach. Co. v. Churchill Gear Machs., [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1199 (C.A.).
The obligation remains so long as the information is confidential, see infra notes 93-128 and ac-
companying text. For the circumstances in which a person may be restrained from using informa-
tion even after it has ceased to be confidential, see infra text accompanying notes 108-17.
46 Copyright Act, 1956, supra note 6, § 2(5)(a).
47 Id § 2(5)(b).
48 Id § 2(5)(f.
49 Id § 2(6).
50 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
51 See generally COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES, supra note 5, ch. 12; C. TAPPER, supra note 5,
at 20-21.
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that in many cases the value of a program lies in the idea or concept of
the program, rather than in the particular expression of the concept.
While there can be no copyright in an idea, publication or use of
an idea may amount to a breach of confidence, and thus give rise to an
action in equity or in law for breach of a confidentiality contract.52
Maximum protection, therefore, is obtained when a copyrighted pro-
gram is also protected as a trade secret. Consideration of the circum-
stances in which this dual protection is available follows.
A. In-House Software
As previously explained, a computer program need not be pub-
lished to enjoy copyright protection. Thus, a program devised and
used only in-house may be copyright under section 2(1) of the 1956 Act
as an unpublished work. Additional protection of in-house software
usually will be provided by the inclusion of specific terms in the firm's
employment contracts. These terms require employees to agree not to
disclose any information deemed confidential in the contract or any
knowledge they acquire during the time they are in the firm's employ.
Even where the employer cannot rely on a contract term providing for
confidentiality, often he may have an action in equity for breach of
confidence against an employee who discloses in-house programs to a
third party.53 Because a program that enjoys copyright protection
under section 2(1) is unpublished by definition, the principles of trade
secret protection and section 2(1) copyright protection do not conflict.54
Where the program is not published by its owners so as to make it
public knowledge and to destroy its confidentiality, the program may
have copyright protection under section 2(1), protection as a trade se-
cret under the equitable confidentiality doctrine, and also contract pro-
tection in cases where employment contracts include confidentiality
terms.
In-house programs, in some circumstances may be eligible only for
52 E.g., Fraser v. Evans, [1969] 1 Q.B. 349, 361-62 (C.A.).
53 Where an employee will inevitably carry away trade secrets in his head, courts have held
that the proper course is not to invoke the equitable breach of confidence doctrine, but to obtain
contractual promises limiting the employee's field of employment when he changes jobs. E.g.,
Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd. v. Guinle, [1979] Ch. 227; United Sterling Corp. v. Felton &
Mannion, [1974] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 162 (Ch.).
54 Any publication not sufficient to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public leaves the
work protected in copyright only as an unpublished work. Copyright Act, 1956, supra note 6,
§ 49(2)(b). Given the definitions of the "public domain" used by the courts in trade secret cases
(discussed infra in text accompanying notes 57-92), it seems unlikely that an unpublished copy-
righted program would ever lose its trade secret protection merely because of some publication not
sufficient to meet the reasonable requirements of the public.
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trade secret protection. Copyright only inheres in works that are origi-
nal or novel. It appears, however, that a program that is not novel
may, nevertheless, be a trade secret. Without express reference to the
state of knowledge of the relevant industry as a whole, in cases where
clear evidence demonstrated that the employers had made special ef-
forts to keep the information secret, the United Kingdom courts have
held that information used only in-house was confidential and a trade
secret. In Amber Size & Chemical Co. v. Menzel, 55 a process was held
to be a trade secret where the equipment used in the process was kept
under secure conditions, and no employees other than those working
on the process were allowed on the floor where it was being developed.
To ensure trade secret status for its in-house computer programs-
whether novel and so copyright, or non-novel and, therefore, protected
as a trade secret or not at all-a firm should keep them under the strict-
est conditions of security possible.16 Access to offices and to computers
should be restricted. Software might be kept in special locked rooms,
entry to which should be limited to those with special keys. Individual
user codes, to be entered into the computer before it will operate,
should be used to ensure limited access. Other factors that would con-
vince a court to treat in-house software as a trade secret are the inclu-
sion of confidentiality clauses in employment contracts, logs or even
confidentiality contracts for visitors, repeated reminders to employees
of the need for secrecy, employment of security guards, controls on the
use of photocopying equipment, and the shredding of documents and
destruction of software no longer used.
B. Published Software
The antithetical nature of the doctrines informing the law of trade
secrets and of copyright renders the availability of dual protection
under those laws uncertain in any situation in which copyright attaches
to software under section 2(2) of the 1956 Act by virtue of its publica-
tion. In such cases, whether the program is also protected as a trade
55 30 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 433, 438 (Ch. 1913). It is suggested, see infra text accompanying
note 70, that the court was wrong not to look at the state of knowledge in the industry as a whole.
The degree of knowledge in the industry is an important factor in deciding if the information
qualifies as a trade secret. That information is not completely novel, however, may not be a bar to
its being treated as confidential.
56 For a description of IBM's methods for keeping its trade secrets, see Wall St. J., July 2,
1982, at 1, col. 6. As an example, IBM took over the trash-collection system at Peachtree Software
Inc. while Peachtree was developing software for an IBM computer, causing Peachtree employees
to name the operation "Project KGB."
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secret will depend on whether its publication was such as to make the
program non-confidential.
C. Types of publication that will destroy confidentiality
Discussion of the types of publication that destroy the confidenti-
ality of the published program, and the types that meet the statutory
criteria for a publication attracting copyright, but that, nevertheless,
leave the program a trade secret helps identify those situations in which
dual protection is available.
(1) Publication in general
English law provides no clear answer to the question of the degree
of publication necessary before the published information ceases to be
regarded as confidential for the purposes of the law of trade secrets.
Two of the leading cases concern the publication of information in a
patent specification. In 0. Mustad & Son v. Dosen, the plaintiff com-
pany sought an injunction to restrain a former employee from commu-
nicating to a rival firm information relating to a machine used in the
making of fish hooks. The plaintiffs alleged that any such communica-
tion would breach the confidentiality term in the defendant's employ-
ment contract. Prior to instituting the action, the plaintiffs already had
applied in Germany for a patent in respect of the information alleged
to be confidential. Before the action came to trial, the plaintiffs also
had applied for a patent in the United Kingdom, and the application
had become available for public inspection at the Patent Office. Decid-
ing for the defendant, the House of Lords held that "after the disclo-
sure [of the information in the patent specification] had been made by
the plaintiffs to the world, it was impossible for them to get an injunc-
tion restraining the defendants from disclosing what was common
knowledge. The secret, as a secret, had ceased to exist." 8
The Mustad decision has been followed in a case in which the
plaintiff's patent specification was published only in Belgium, and was
not available to the public in England, on the shelves of the Patent
Office Library, until two years later. In Franchi v. Franchi,59 it ap-
peared that the Belgian patents probably would be inspected in
Belgium by United Kingdom patent agents as soon as they were pub-
lished. The court took the view that by applying for the patent the
plaintiffs had begun a process that would inevitably lead to the pat-
57 [1963] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 41 (H.L. 1928).
58 Id at 43 (Lord Buckmaster).
59 [1967] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 149 (Ch.).
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ented information becoming known to their competitors soon after
publication in Belgium.
60
The patenting procedure involves publication to the whole world.
Registration of a patent specification is intended to give the public as a
whole access to the patented information. Such publicity is the essence
of the patent doctrine: confidentiality is given up in return for a limited
period of monopoly over the invention. It is not surprising then, that
the United Kingdom courts hold that any claim to trade secret protec-
tion evaporates on plaintiff's publication of a patent specification. Al-
though computer programs cannot be patented in the United Kingdom,
they may be patentable in some other countries, most notably in the
United States.61 The United Kingdom courts, applying Mustad and
Franchi, almost certainly would hold that the publication outside the
United Kingdom of a patent specification for a computer program de-
stroys the confidentiality of the program, and with it any possibility of
United Kingdom trade secret protection.
The position is less clear where the confidential information ap-
pears in a patent specification published by a third party, not by the
program owner who is alleging breach of confidence.62 In Cranleigh
Precision Engineering Ltd v. Bryant,63 a third party had published the
allegedly confidential information in a Swiss patent. The court rejected
the defense that because the publication was in the public domain it
was not confidential. It distinguished Mustad on the ground that the
publication in that case had been by the plaintiff himself, not by a third
party who had arrived at the information independently. It is sug-
gested that this point was decided wrongly' and that it is the fact of
publication in a patent specification that destroys secrecy, no matter
who publishes the program. Of course, a person may be under a duty
not to disclose information even when that information has been pub-
lished by a third party and, therefore, is in the public domain and not
confidential. But such a duty cannot arise from any obligation of confi-
dence under the law of trade secrets. 6 The decision in Cranleigh with-
60 Id at 153.
61 See, eg., Roberts, The Current Law ofPatentsfor Computer Software: or Benson Revisited,
1 COMPUTER LJ. 85 (1978).
62 This situation could arise when two producers have independently developed the same pro-
gram or program elements.
63 [1966] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 81 (Ch.).
64 The same view is taken by Braithwaite, Trade Secrets: The Spring-Board Unsprung, 42
MOD. L. REv. 94, 95-96 (1979), and by the Law Commission, LAW COMMISSION No. 110, supra
note 36, 4.29.
65 No duty arises unless the information is such that it does damage only when it is actually
known, and not when it merely may become known because it is available in a source to which the
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out doubt was correct, but for the reason that the defendant, who was
managing director of the plaintiff company, was in breach of thefiduci-
ary duty he owed to the company.
66
The courts probably would apply the reasoning behind Mustad
and Franchi in any case in which confidentiality is claimed for a pro-
gram that has been copyrighted in a country requiring registration as a
condition of copyright protection.67 Public access to the copyright reg-
ister would lead to knowledge of the program amongst the copyright
owner's competitors just as certainly as would the publication of a for-
eign patent specification.6  Therefore, programs registered as copyright
in the United States cannot be protected as trade secrets in the United
Kingdom.
Patent and copyright registration represent one extreme of publi-
cation: availability of the information to any person who inspects the
register. It is more difficult to decide what lesser degrees of publication
are likely to result in a court holding that confidentiality has been lost.
It has been seen that a program need not be novel to be confidential,
closely guarded programs being trade secrets despite others in the in-
public has access. This distinction explains the decision in Schering Chemicals Ltd. v. Falkman
Ltd., [1982] Q.B. 1 (C.A.), where the court held the discloser of information to be in breach of
confidence even though the information had been published previously in the press and on televi-
sion. The information concerned a drug produced by plaintiff, which had allegedly caused defor-
mities in the drug user's babies. The damage this information might cause plaintiff, in the form of
loss of public confidence, would depend on actual knowledge of the information, which would
increase with each publication. Plaintiff clearly benefited from the continuing confidentiality.
Where industrial or commercial information is concerned, however, the damage is complete with
the first publication: competitors are on the lookout for such information and can be expected to
take full advantage of any appearance of the information in the public domain. See, e.g., Franchi
v. Franchi, [1967] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 149 (Ch.), in which the publication of a patent specification
in Belgium was held to have begun a process that would inevitably lead to knowledge of the
information amongst competitors in the United Kingdom shortly after publication. Given the
competition in the computer industry, programs would often cease to be confidential when they
first enter the public domain. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
66 Defendant Bryant did not inform plaintiff company of the existence of the Swiss patents.
He "quite deliberately concealed. . . the whole of his knowledge of the dangers to the plaintiffs
which the existence of the [Swiss] patent involved.. . intending. . . to turn his knowledge to his
own advantage." [1966] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. at 93. The court concluded that Bryant's "whole
purpose was to use the knowledge he thus possessed to damage the plaintiffs." Id A duty not to
disclose information already in the public domain could also arise under contract.
67 Under the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976), copyright inheres in a pro-
gram as soon as it is fixed in tangible form, but registration within five years of creation is advan-
tageous (e.g., in allowing one to elect statutory rather than actual damages), and is necessary prior
to suing an infringer.
68 In the United States, the program copy deposited for registration is available for public
inspection in the Copyright Office. For long programs, only the first and last twenty pages need be
deposited.
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dustry having independently developed the same program.6 9 A corol-
lary of the rule that confidentiality is retained even though some other
person has developed the same program should be that the confidenti-
ality of a novel program is not lost merely by the publication of the
program to some other persons. But, in both cases there is a limit to the
number of persons who can know of the information-whether by in-
dependent development or by publication-before it ceases to be pro-
tected as a trade secret. Despite an early case in which the court held
that a closely guarded process was confidential without any express ref-
erence being made to the state of knowledge of the rest of the indus-
try,7" it is submitted that the better view is that irrespective of whether
the information in question is non-novel because discovered by others
independently, or novel but published to some other persons, one must
look at the knowledge of the whole industry to decide if the informa-
tion remains sufficiently confidential to enjoy protection as a trade se-
cret. If the nature and extent of the knowledge of the information
amongst others within the industry is such that a significant commer-
cial benefit would result from preventing wider dissemination of the
information, then knowledge within the industry should not destroy
confidentiality for the purposes of trade secret law. Under this test,
something less than complete secrecy often would be enough to retain
trade secret protection.
This view is supported by a number of English cases. In Franchi v.
Franchi,7 I the court cited with approval the United States case of Vul-
can Detinning Co. v. Assam,72 where it was held that a process was
confidential even though it was completely known by a German and by
a Dutch company. Mr. Justice Cross said that:
Clearly a claim that the disclosure of some information would be a breach
of confidence is not to be defeated simply by proving that there are other
people in the world who know the facts in question besides the man as to
whom it is said that his disclosure would be a breach of confidence and
those to whom he has disclosed them.
7 3
Nothing seems to turn on the means by which other people come to
know of the information. Thus, it seems likely that Mr. Justice Cross
intended the same confidentiality test, whether the knowledge was
achieved independently or resulted from the plaintiffs publication. In
69 See supra text accompanying note 55.
70 Amber Size & Chem. Co. v. Menzel, 30 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 433 (Ch. 1913).
71 [1967] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 149 (Ch.). See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for
further discussion of this case.
72 185 A.D. 399 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918).
73 Franchil, [1967] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. at 152 (dictum).
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either case, whether confidentiality continues is a question of degree,
and the plaintiff will succeed if "relative secrecy" remains. 4
The view that relative as opposed to absolute secrecy is required
for information to be confidential receives further support from the de-
cision in Morris Ltd v. Gilman (B.S. T) Ltd ," that information could
be confidential even though known to persons in Germany. Further-
more, in Exchange Telegraph Ltd v. Central News Ltd ,76 the court held
that information was confidential where it:
had become public to the world of Manchester. . . . But the informa-
tion was not made known to the whole world; it was no doubt known to a
large number of persons, but a great many more were ignorant of it. By
the expenditure of labour and money the plaintiffs had acquired this in-
formation, and it was in their hands valuable property in this sense-that
persons to whom it was not known were willing to pay. .. money to
acquire it.
77
Thus, the Exchange Telegraph case seems to show that secrecy may be
sufficient for legal confidentiality where, despite the fact that a substan-
tial number of interested persons know of the information, a significant
number of persons who would benefit from knowledge of the informa-
tion remain unfamiliar with it.78 If people would still pay for the infor-
mation, confidentiality is beneficial. Only when nothing worth
protecting remains, because the information is so easily obtained that
people will not pay for it, is confidentiality lost. Such a rule effectively
narrows the interested public whose state of knowledge has to be con-
sidered to those who might be prepared to pay for new information;
that is, to competitors.79
If the interested public consists of the research staffs of highly
competitive industries such as the computer software and firmware in-
dustries, almost any information capable of being acquired by legiti-
mate means, and without the expenditure of a significant element of
labor, skill or money, 0 will be regarded as insufficiently secret for pro-
tection."' Confidentiality is not lost, however, simply because pro-
74 Id at 153.
75 60 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 20 (Ch. 1943).
76 [1897] 2 Ch. 48.
77 Id at 53.
78 See A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 82 (1962).
79 See, e.g., Franchi v. Franchi, [1967] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 149, 153 (Ch.), where the court
focused its attention on the ability of competitors to have access to the published patent
specification.
80 LAW COMMISSION No. 110, supra note 36, 4.19.
81 See Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Scorah, 55 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 21, 27-28 (Ch. 1937) (court
distinguished "general information," obtainable by any legitimate means, from "special informa-
tion such as secret processes").
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grams are widely marketed and are capable of reverse analysis or of
being copied, because:
the mere publication of an article by manufacturing it and placing it upon
the market, whether by means of work done in it or calculation or mea-
surement which would enable information to be gained, is not necessarily
sufficient to make such information available to the public. The question
in each case is: Is such information available to the public? It is not, in
my view, if work would have to be done upon it to make it available.
8 2
It is submitted that the important question in each case is not "does
work have to be done to make the information available?" but "how
much work would have to be done, how much money spent, in copying
or reverse engineering this particular program?" The more difficult the
reverse engineering or copying process, the more likely it is that the
program will be held to be confidential.8 3 Similarly, even though all
the separate features of the program have been published, if the whole
result has not been achieved yet, and could not be achieved without
someone performing the same kind of process as the person who de-
vised the program, then it does not cease to be confidential merely by
reason of such publication.
8 4
(2) Publication to Licensees
No United Kingdom case law deals specifically with the question
of the degree of disclosure to licensees that is permissible before the
information ceases to be confidential. Whether disclosure under multi-
ple license agreements destroys confidentiality is, it is submitted, a
question of degree, centering on the relative secrecy of the information
in the interested section of the industry. Protection is much more likely
when all disclosures have been confidential than where secrecy has
lapsed. 5 Trade secret status may be more easily retained if multiple
disclosures to licensees are made subject to a contract providing for
82 Ackroyds (London) Ltd. v. Islington Plastics Ltd., [1962] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 97, 104 (Ch.).
See also Saltman Eng'g Co. v. Campbell Eng'g Co., 65 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 203, 215 (C.A. 1948)
(Lord Greene, M.R.) (leather punches available on the market; drawings for making them never-
theless held confidential). Accord Harvey Tiling Co. v. Rodomac Ltd., [1977] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas.
399 (Sup. Ct. South Africa).
83 Currently, many commercially available programs can be copied exactly, even by a novice.
There are now plans to prevent easy copying in the next generation of computers and programs,
by the use of "serial number matching" and ROM program storage systems. The current position
is explained in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1983, at 28, col. 1.
94 Ansell Rubber Co. v. Allied Rubber Indus., Ltd., [1972] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 811 (Sup. Ct.
Victoria).
85 See Fraser v. Thames Television Ltd., [1983] 2 All E.R. 101, 122 (Q.B.) (confidentiaUity
remained intact where later disclosure to third parties was also in confidence). See also A. TUR-
NER, supra note 78, at 17.
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confidentiality than if the discloser solely relies on the information hav-
ing been deemed confidential by law because the circumstances in
which the disclosure was made imparted an obligation of confidence.
Because one of the circumstances the court considers in determining if
the law imposes an obligation of confidence is the extent of the publica-
tion, multiple disclosures without specifically requiring confidentiality
might negate the usual presumption that a licensee owes a duty of con-
fidence to his licensor. If a licensor expects to enter into a significant
number of agreements for the licensing of any particular program, each
agreement should contain a confidentiality clause; otherwise, multiple
publication might result in the loss of trade secret protection.
(3) Publication and Copyright
A publication is not sufficient to cause copyright to attach to the
published work under section 2(2) of the 1956 Act unless the publica-
tion is more than colorable and is "intended to satisfy the reasonable
requirements of the public."8 6 Copyright is the form of protection most
commonly relied upon for those software programs that are marketed
to the general computer using public. When a computer program is put
on general sale to computer owners (e.g., a game or educational pro-
gram for use by those with "home" computers) this clearly constitutes
publication for the purposes of the Copyright Act 1956; and yet, such
publication does not necessarily end any claims of confidentiality. A
program published in this way is protected in copyright and may be
protected as a trade secret if significant effort would be required to re-
verse-engineer or copy the program.
The position is less certain when publication occurs under a li-
cense agreement to trade users of programs. It is submitted that the
availability of a program to those prepared to enter into a license agree-
ment governing its use constitutes publication sufficient to satisfy the
reasonable requirements of the public, for the purposes of the copyright
law. First, it is probably not necessary that the program be sold out-
right before there is a publication to which copyright may attach: by
analogy to section 13(10) of the 1956 Act, which provides that "'publi-
cation', in relation to a cinematograph film means the sale, letting on
hire, or offer for sale or hire, of copies of film to the public,"8" licensing
ought to be sufficient. Second, software licensees as a class should con-
stitute a "public" for the purposes of the Act. The usual, non-technical
meaning given to the phrase "the public" is "the community in gen-
86 Copyright Act, 1956, supra note 6, § 49(2)(b).
87 Id § 13(10).
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eral." It is clear, however, that in the context of copyright law, publica-
tion to one sector of the general community may be sufficient to satisfy
the reasonable requirements of the public and thus attract protection. 8
Although distribution of a work to a few friends, 9 or only a colorable
publication90 are insufficient, publication to a restricted class of persons
may form the basis of copyright protection.9' Licensed program users
probably form such a class.
Because publication to licensees will not necessarily put an end to
the confidentiality of the licensed software, 9u particularly if the licenses
contain confidentiality clauses, it is likely that many licensed programs
will be protected against unauthorized disclosure under the trade secret
laws and against unauthorized copying under the Copyright Act.
IV. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONFIDENCE:
PUBLISHED PROGRAMS
Consideration will now be given to the effects of publication on
trade secret protection in contract generally and then in equity at three
different stages in the development of an action for breach of confi-
dence-publication before the original disclosure by the plaintiff which
it is claimed was made under circumstances imparting an obligation of
confidence; after that original publication but before the disclosure by
the defendant which it is claimed was made in breach of that obliga-
tion; and after the wrongful disclosure but before judgment.
A. Effect of publication by plaintiff. Actions in contract
In an action for breach of a confidentiality term in a contract, a
plaintiff's secrecy-ending publication of the protected software prior to
88 See, e.g., Jennings v. Stephens, [1936] Ch. 469 (C.A.) (audience consisting of members of a
Village Women's Institute sufficient "public").
89 Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326, 345 (H.L. 1887).
90 See, e.g., Francis, Day & Hunter v. Feldman & Co., [1914] 2 Ch. 728 (C.A.); Bodley Head v.
Flegan, [19721 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 587 (Ch.).
91 See MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914) (university student body); Harms
(Inc.) Ltd. v. Martans Club Ltd., [1926] Ch. 870 (performance at exclusive club held to be in
"public"); Ernest Turner Elec. Instruments Ltd. v. Performing Rights So'y, [1943] Ch. 167 (C.A.)
(performance of music in factory held to be in "public"). These are all infringement cases. A
defendant infringes copyright by wrongfully "publishing the work," Copyright Act, 1956, supra
note 6, § 2(5), and such publication technically is not covered by the definition of "publication" as
meaning "issued to the public," id § 49(2)(c). It is submitted, however, that there is no substantial
difference between publication for the purposes of getting copyright protection, and "publishing
the work" for the purposes of the law governing infringement, in regard at least to what consti-
tutes, in each case, the relevant "public." See general, H. LADDIE, P. PREsCOTT & M. VrrORIA,
supra note 5, 1 2.88-2.90.
92 See supra text accompanying note 85.
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judgment can have no effect on the defendant's technical liability for
breach of contract. If the software has been deemed confidential in the
contract, whether it is in fact confidential is irrelevant in deciding
whether or not there has been a breach.9 3 A publication that puts an
end to the program's confidentiality will, however, be an important fac-
tor in the court's decision as to the appropriateness of the requested
remedy, and in particular will prevent the issue of an injunction.94
(1) Damages for past breaches
A plaintiff's damages for breach of contract are the amount of his
loss-generally, the market value of the benefit of which he has been
deprived by reason of the breach. If the software ceased to be confi-
dential as the result of the plaintiffs publication before the defendant's
disclosure of it to a third party, the "benefit" of confidentiality will
have had little or no value and the damages award will reflect this.9 5
If the plaintiff publishes the software after the defendant's wrong-
ful disclosure but before judgment, any proceeds of that publication
should be set off against the damage award.96 A plaintiff has the duty
to take all steps a reasonable and prudent person might in the ordinary
course of business properly take to mitigate the loss consequent on the
breach. In some circumstances, the court might require plaintiff's pub-
lication of the software as a reasonable act in mitigation of the loss. 97
(2) Injunction to prevent future breaches
The injunction is an equitable remedy, available at law by virtue
of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, and or-
dered by a court when it is just and convenient9" to do so. Although
the injunction is a discretionary remedy, where the defendant is in
breach of contract, as a matter of course the English courts usually will
issue an injunction to prevent future breaches. The general rule is that
the mere fact of a breach is sufficient grounds for an injunction. 99
93 But see supra note 33.
94 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
95 Franchi v. Franchi, [1967] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 149 (Ch.).
96 See H. MCGREGOR, supra note 32, ch. 7, and cases cited therein.
97 See CHrrY ON CONTRACTs, supra note 32, 1 1592-1601.
98 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 49, § 45(1) says
'Just or convenient," but it has been held that mere convenience is not enough. Eg., Beddow v.
Beddow, 9 Ch. D. 89, 93 (1878).
99 Thus, the usual rule that damages must be an inadequate remedy before the court will grant
an injunction does not apply where plaintiff is claiming a prohibitory injunction against breach of
a negative covenant. E.g., Marco Prod. Ltd. v. Pagola, [1945] K.B. Il1. Seegeneraly H. BEALE,
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 129 (1980); R. MEGARRY & P. BAKER, SNELL'S PRINCI-
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Thus, it is usually no defense to a request for an injunction to prevent
further breaches of contract that the initial breach caused the plaintiff
no loss. 00
If these general rules were applied in actions for injunctions to
prevent breach of confidentiality terms, a plaintiff's secrecy-destroying
publication of the software protected by such a term would not prevent
him from obtaining an injunction. Although dicta in the English cases
support the application of general contract remedy principles in breach
of confidence cases,101 in Mustad & Son v. Dosen, 1 2 the House of Lords
seems to have decided that the usual rules as to the availability of an
injunction in breach of contract cases do not apply where the claim is
based on breach of a term requiring confidentiality. In that case, the
defendant had been employed by the plaintiffs and had entered into a
written agreement with them in which he expressly promised that he
would not disclose, directly or indirectly, information he was exposed
to in the course of employment. The defendant did in fact disclose
information about a machine used by the plaintiffs; bit after the plain-
tiffs had issued a writ to begin an action for breach of contract, they
patented the machine. In deciding for the defendant and affirming the
Court of Appeals' decision to lift the injunction against him, the House
of Lords held that it was impossible for the plaintiffs to get an injunc-
tion restraining the defendants from disclosing what was, as a result of
the patent application, common knowledge." 3
In principle, no reason exists for not applying the general rules
governing contract actions to claims for an injunction to prevent
breaches of confidentiality clauses. The rule in Mustad may be the re-
sult of some confusion between actions for breach of confidentiality in
contract and those in equity. It has been suggested that in equity ac-
tions, information will be regarded as confidential so long as there is
some significant benefit in preventing its further publication.1" By def-
inition, therefore, information that is no longer treated as confidential
in equity will be information the continued secrecy of which will be of
no benefit to the plaintiff. If no benefit derives from preventing future
PLES OF EQUITY 626 (27th ed. 1973) ("[A] party to a contract has a right to its performance and not
merely to compensation for breach, and hence an injunction will be granted to restrain breaches of
negative contracts" (footnotes omitted)).
100 See generally CHTrrY ON CONTRACTS, .pra note 32, 1673-74.
101 Reid & Sigrist Ltd. v. Moss & Mechanism Ltd., 49 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 461,480 (Ch. 1932),
citing Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare. 241, 258 (Ch. D. 1851); Lamb v. Evans, [1893] 1 Ch. 218, 237
(C.A.); Merryweather & Son v. Moore, [1892] 2 Ch. 518.
102 [1963] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 41 (H.L. 1928).
103 Id at 43 (Lord Buckmaster).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
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publication, no injunction will be issued in equity to prevent such pub-
lication. The courts, however, do not require a plaintiff suing for an
injunction to prevent future breaches of a contract term to show that a
breach will cause him loss-unless the term is one requiring confidenti-
ality. Thus, the court in Mustad transferred the equitable requirement
that the plaintiff show he would benefit from an injunction to a con-
tractual breach of confidence case.
The Mustad case seems to hold that an injunction will not be or-
dered unless the information protected by the confidentiality clause is
confidential in fact at the time ofjudgment. If this is the rule, an excep-
tion probably exists where a secrecy-ending publication occurs after the
breach but before judgment. In such circumstances, an injunction may
be issued to prevent the defendant or his disclosee from wrongfully
using the confidential program in any way that would give him a head
start over competitors who, as a result of the plaintiff's publication,
have access to the previously confidential software. This so-called
"springboard" principle has not been discussed in any contract cases.
Nonetheless, by analogy to the breach of confidence cases in equity,
discussed in the next section, the equitable remedy of an injunction
ought to be available to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from
his head start.
B. Effect of publication by plaintiff-Actions for
breach of confidence
In this section, the effect of a publication that destroys confidenti-
ality is discussed in relation to actions in equity for breach of
confidence.
(1) Publication prior to plaintif's original disclosure to the defendant
No action in equity for breach of confidence can succeed unless
the software was confidential at the time the plaintiff disclosed it to the
defendant. The necessary condition of confidentiality is that the
software must have been secret and not in the public domain at that
time.
05
(2) Publication after original disclosure to defendant but before
defendant's disclosure to a third party
The general rule appears to be that the defendant commits no
breach of confidence so long as he does not use or disclose the informa-
105 See, e.g., Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng'rs) Ltd., [1969] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 41, 47 (Ch.).
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tion disclosed to him by the plaintiff contrary to the confidence under
which it was imparted, while the information is still confidential (that
is, confidential enough for protection). 06 Therefore no damages or in-
junction will be awarded where secrecy was lost before the defendant's
disclosure.
(3) Publication after defendant's disclosure to a third
party but before judgment
A plaintiff who publishes previously confidential information after
the defendant has disclosed it wrongfully may obtain an injunction in
some circumstances to prevent the defendant's continued use of the in-
formation; and a plaintiff may obtain damages in equity for past
breaches of confidence, even though no injunction is ordered.
(a) Injunction
If a plaintiff's publication of his program destroys its confidential-
ity (as where he has published a foreign patent specification or copy-
right registration), then, in general, no injunction will be ordered.
10 7
Defendant's repetition of the information constitutes no further viola-
tion because the obligation of confidence ceases once the information
itself is no longer secret.
The general rule is not without exception however. An injunction
will be ordered despite publication before judgment where, by reason
of his use of the information in breach of confidence, the defendant has
obtained a head start over competitors. This exception derives from
Lord Greene's view in Saltman Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineer-
ing Co. ,108 that a person to whom information had been disclosed in
confidence could not lawfully shorten his labors by uncontemplated
use of that information. It has come to be known as the "springboard
principle." Mr. Justice Roxburgh has said that:
IT]he essence of this branch of the law ... is that a person who has ob-
tained information in confidence is not allowed to use it as a springboard
for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential com-
munication, and springboard it remains even when all the features have
been published or can be ascertained by actual inspection by any member
of the public.'
°9
106 See A. TURNER, supra note 78, at 427; COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES, supra note 5, 732.
107 See R. MEGARRY & P. BAKER, supra note 99, at 626.
108 65 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 203, 215 (Ch. 1948).
109 Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders' Supply Co., [1967] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 375, 391 (Ch. 1959), a t'd,
[1960] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 128 (C.A.).
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Lord Denning M.R. approved this view in Seager v. Copydex Ltd 110
Counsel in Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp. v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd ...
argued that the "springboard principle" is inconsistent with the deci-
sion of the House of Lords in the Mustad case. Mustad held that no
injunction would be issued against a company that apparently had used
confidential information obtained from an ex-employee of the plaintiffs
to construct a machine similar to that perfected by the plaintiffs, be-
cause the plaintiff had later published the details of that machine in a
patent specification. Though it would appear from the facts that the
defendant may have achieved a head start from its breach of confi-
dence, the case is not an authority against the springboard principle
because it was not argued before the court. The point was not decided
in Peter Pan Mfg., but in Cranleigh Precision Engineering v. Bryant,
t l2
Mr. Justice Roskill said in dicta that Mustad was not inconsistent with
the springboard analysis."I3
The question arises as to how long the springboard lasts. Dicta in
some cases indicate that it is irrelevant that the defendant is put in a
worse position than the rest of the world. 4 The better view seems to be
that once the defendant has lost the advantage over the rest of the
world that he obtained through the breach of confidence, the injunction
should cease." 5 This latter approach was taken by Lord Denning M.R.
110 [1967] R.P.D. & T.M Cas. 349, 367-68 (C.A.).
111 [1963] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 45, 46-47 (Ch.).
112 [1964] 3 All E.R. 289, 302 (Ch.). See also Ackroyds Ltd. v. Islington Plastics Ltd., [1962]
R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 97, 103-04 (Ch.).
113 The Law Commission takes the view that the springboard principle and the rule that infor-
mation ceases to be confidential once it enters the public domain are not incompatible. LAW
COMMISSION No. 110, supra note 36, 4.31. The springboard principle is retained in the Commis-
sion's Draft Bill:
§ 16-(1) The court may, if it thinks fit in the case of a defendant in proceedings for breach of
confidence under this Act, grant relief under this section in respect of the future use by him of
the information to which the breach relates notwithstanding that such use will occur at a time
when the information has, or is likely to have, come into the public domain (and accordingly
ceased to be subject to an obligation of confidence).
(2) The relief which may be granted by the court under this section in the case of such
defendant [includes]-
(a) an injunction for such period and on such terms as appear to the court to be neces-
sary to prevent the defendant from enjoying an advantage in the exploitation of the
information in question over persons able to exploit it only as from its coming into the
public domain ...
Id at 222.
114 E.g., Reid & Sigrist Ltd. v. Moss & Mechanism Ltd., 49 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 461 (Ch. 1932).
This is the view taken in those United States jurisdictions that follow the rule in Shellmar Prod.
Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936).
115 A. TURNER, supra note 78, at 436-37. Compare the view taken in United States jurisdic-
tions that follow the rule in Conmar Prod. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150
(2nd Cir. 1949), that a person who has used information wrongfully cannot be enjoined from
using it once it has become public knowledge.
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in Potters-Ballotini Ltd v. Weston Baker,"I6 where he said that: "Al-
though a man must not use [confidential] information as a springboard
to get a start over others, nevertheless that springboard does not last for
ever. If he does use it, a time may come when so much has happened
that he can no longer be restrained."
'"17
(b) Damages
Where an action is brought only in equity it is uncertain whether
an independent right to damages for a past breach of confidence is
available. " 8 Equitable rights are usually protected by injunction, with
damages granted only in lieu of an injunction, 119 under Lord Cairn's
Act, 1858.120 Under this rule, where there is no case for the grant of an
injunction,' 21 it seems that no damages ought to be awarded. Never-
theless, the Court of Appeals in Seager v. Copydex Ltd 122 appears to
have held that damages may be awarded for past breaches, independ-
ent of any claim for an injunction to prevent future breaches. The
measure of damages depends on the nature of the confidential informa-
tion.23 If it was information that could be obtained by employing a
commercial consultant, damages are the fee the consultant would have
charged for the information.' 24 But if the information was special, in-
volving an inventive step, then the court may award a sum arrived at
by capitalizing the royalty that the plaintiff might expect to receive for
the use of such information.125 The latter measure is particularly ap-
propriate where the information concerned is a computer program
marketed by the defendant. On the other hand, an adaption of the
measure based on a consultant's fee is warranted where the defendant
has used the program itself: damages equal to the licensing fees the
116 [19771 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 202, 206 (C.A.),followed in Harrison v. Project & Design Co.
(Redcar), [1978] F.S.R. 81 (Ch.).
117 The Law Commission also recommends that the injunction should last only long enough to
prevent the defendant from enjoying an advantage over others who have had to wait until the
information reached the public domain. Draft Bill, § 16(2)(a),printed in LAW COMMISSION No.
110, supra note 36. See also supra note 113.
118 Nichrotherm Elec. Co. v. Percy, [1957] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 207 (Ch.).
119 E.g., Malone v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1979] Ch. 344, 360.
120 Chancery Amendment Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. ch. 27, § 2. See now Supreme Court Act,
1981, ch. 54, § 50.
121 For instance, in a situation where the springboard doctrine does not apply and where infor-
mation has been published prior to judgment, thus destroying confidentiality, no injunction will
be granted.
122 [19671 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 349 (C.A.).
123 Seager v. Copydex Ltd. (No. 2), [1969] R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 250 (C.A.).
124 Id at 256.
125 Id
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plaintiff would have charged the defendant for its use of the software
would be awarded.
Where damages are awarded in lieu of an injunction, this effects a
sale of the program to the defendant. "Once a lump sum is assessed
and paid, then the confidential information would belong to the de-
fendants in the same way as if they had bought and paid for it by an
agreement of sale."' 26 This rule may also operate where the defendant
is ordered to pay a royalty on the income it has produced by marketing
the plaintiffs program. But it is submitted that when the defendant
itself has used the program, without marketing it, damages could be in
the amount of the appropriate license fee. Because licenses invariably
include confidentiality clauses, it will often be just to award damages
that recognize the existence of a continuing obligation of confidence
owed by the defendant, but leave ownership of the program in the
plaintiff. The defendant may then use the program as a licensee, but
would be bound by a licensee's equitable obligation of confidence.
This results because the court allows the defendant to continue using
the program in return for damages; it has recognized the plaintiffs
right to exploit the program in the future by awarding damages com-
mensurate with a fee for a license that includes a confidentiality clause.
If there is room for commercial exploitation of the program in the fu-
ture, there seems to be no reason why the court should not leave owner-
ship in the plaintiff. 27
In cases where the plaintiff lost confidentiality by publishing the
program after the defendant's wrongful disclosure but before judg-
ment, damages should be awarded to cover only the period during
which the information remained confidential. In this type of case, "as a
matter of right. . . the [plaintiffs] are entitled at their option to claim
damages .. or alternatively, an account of the profits made."' 28
V. CONCLUSION
Even though copyright protection for published computer pro-
grams depends on publication that meets the reasonable needs of the
public, and trade secrecy protection depends on the information not
being in the public domain, it is possible that some computer programs
126 Id
127 The Law Commission makes no specific recommendations regarding the basis for assessing
damages where commercially exploitable information is involved; it prefers flexibility in this area.
LAW COMMISSION No. 110, supra note 36, 6.107.
128 Peter Pan Mfg. Corp. v. Corsets Silhouette Ltd., [1963] R.P.D. &.T.M. Cas. 45, 58-60 (Ch.)
(the report has "defendants" instead of "plaintiffs," an error).
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may enjoy both types of protection. This could arise where the reason-
able needs of the "public" are met without putting the program in the
"public domain." A program owner who can obtain both types of pro-
tection ensures not only that his program cannot be copied lawfully,
but also that the ideas contained in it cannot be stolen with impunity.
Whenever possible, program owners should arrange their United King-
dom operations so as to preserve both types of protection.
